NOTES
ADMIRALTY: CONTRIBUTION AND THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACT

A

GENERAL RULE of admiralty law provides that when a collision is
the fault of both parties thereto, the aggregate damages arising out of
the collision will be divided and borne equally.' Traditionally, the
aggregate damages include payments made by the owners of each ship
for personal injuries or damages to cargo aboard either vessel.2 The
recent case of United States v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co.' held, however,
that in a division with the United States, the owner of a ship that had
collided with a public vessel of the United States could not include
payments it had made to a seaman of the government vessel.
The Weyerhaeuser case arose upon cross libels of the Weyerhaeuser
Company and the United States for damages resulting from a collision
of the S.S. F.E. Weyerhaeuser and the Army dredge Pacifx.4 The
trial court found that the collision had been caused by the negligence
of both vessels and ordered the damages divided. Weyerhaeuser sought
to include in the division 16,ooo dollars it had paid to one Reynold
Ostrom, a civil servant seaman of the Pacific, in settlement of damages
Ostrom claimed for injuries resulting from the collision. The United
States, having paid compensation benefits to Ostrom, objected to the
inclusion of the i6,ooo dollars in the division.' The trial court in' See The Catharine, 58 U.S. (

7

How.) 170 (1854.).

The division is usually made by a payment from the vessel least damaged to the vessel
most damaged of one-half the difference between their respective damages. See generally
GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 402-03, 434-42 (1957).
* See The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899); The "Alabama" and The "Gamecock," 9 z U.S. 695 (1875); The Washington and The Gregory, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 513
(x869).
a 294 F.zd 179 ( 9 th Cir. 196t), cert. granted, 369 U.S. Sio (x962).
'The Weyerhaeuser Company brought its libel against the United States under the
Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 78t-9o (1958).
'In addition to the $i 6,ooo, the trial court found that the S.S. F.E. Weyer-aeurer
suffered $17,652.13 physical and detention damages, for a total of $43,652.13, and that

the Pacific suffered total damages of $37,439.26.

Because Weyerhaeuser's damages ex-

ceeded those of the United States by $6,212.87, one-half this figure, or $3,1o6.44, was

ordered paid by the United States to Weyerhaeuser. 294 F.2d at i go.
If the $16,ooo is not included, Weyerhaeuser's total is but $27,652.13, or $9,787.13
less than the United States' total. Presumably the United States is now entitled to an
award of one-half the new difference, or $4,893.56, to be paid by Weyerhaeuser. It
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duded8 the payment and the United States appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the shipowner could not include the i6,ooo dollars in the division. The
decision was based on Section 2o (b) 7 of the Federal Employers Compensation Act,8 which purports to make the United States' liability
under that statute its exclusive liability to anyone who might otherwise
have had, under any other act, a right to recover against the United
States on account of a federal employee's injury. The court felt that
to allow contribution would conflict with a statutory policy of exclusive
liability9 and thus concluded that the maritime right had been abrogated
by section 2oi (b). 10
will be observed that the resulting loss to Weyerhaeuser, and gain to the United States,
is the sum of the award it has lost ($3,106.44) and the award it must now pay
($4,893.56).
That sum is, of course, $8,ooo, which is one-half the $x6,ooo in dispute.
'Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 663, as supplei ented at 178
F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Cal. z959).
7 63 Stat. 861 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 7 5 7 (b) (1958), is as follows:
"The liability of the United States or any of its instrumentalities under sections 751756, 757-78z, 783-79z and 793 of this title or any extension thereof with respect to the
injury or death of an employee shall be exclusive, and in place, of all other liability of
the United States or such instrumentality to the employee, his legal representative, spouse,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwie entitled to recover damages from the
United States or such instrumentality, on account of such injury or death, in any direct
judicial proceedings in a civil action or in admiralty, or by proceedings, whether administrative or judicial, under any other workmen's compensation law or under any
Federal tort liability statute: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not apply
to a master or a member of the crew of any vessel." (Portions paraphrased or quoted
by the court in Weyerhaeuser italicized.)
'39 Stat. 742 (:9x6), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 751-803a (1958).
£ "The question presented here is a difficult one.
Its resolution will abridge either
the statutory policy or the maritime law. To allow a third party recovery against the
United States on any ground is subversive of the statute limiting liability of the United
States. On the other hand, the money paid Ostrom is an element of the total damages
suffered by appellee. And failure to apportion such damages is a breach of the maritime rule . . . " 294 F.zd at 181.
The court relied heavily on Underwood v. United States, 207 F.2d 862 (oth Cir.
1953), and Smithers & Co. v. Coles, 24.2 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957), which held
respectively that § 2o(b) and the parallel section of the Longshoremen & Harbor
Workers Compensation Act, § s, 44 Stat. x426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958),
excluded an action of the spouse of an injured employee against the employer for consortium. The court said:
"In our opinion the shipowner's right of action is just as dependent upon the em.
ployee's injury as the wife's claim for loss of consortium . .
. If, then, the policy
of the statute bars the wife's action for loss of consortium, it should also bar the shipowner's action for contribution. ' 294 F.ad at x84.
"0"Thus it must be candidly admitted that while the United States once had a duty
to other shipowners to navigate carefully in order not to injure its own employees,
that duty has been abrogated by the Compensation Act." 294 F.2d at 85.
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It is submitted that the Weyerhaeuser decision is not justified by
the terms of section 201(b), by Supreme Court rulings when the
admiralty rule of contribution has conflicted with analogous provisions
of other acts, nor by considerations of policy and justice. Turning first
to section 201(b), it seems that the court overlooked the proviso at the
end of that section which says: "... this subsection shall not apply to
a master or a member of the crew of any vessel." Senate debate reveals
that the proviso's purpose was to negate any implication of a policy
to make the FECA the exclusive liability of the United States for seamen's injuries. Senator Morse, sponsor of the proviso, stated:"1
"Under existing law, Government-employed seamen have been accorded the
right to assert their maritime rights against the United States under the
Suits in Admiralty Act and Public Vessels Act .... I feel they should not
be deprived of benefits they have enjoyed for many years without opportunity to have their arguments carefully considered by the appropriate committees of Congress ....
.
In light of this statutory language and legislative history indicating
a policy of non-exclusiveness of the FECA in cases of seamen's injuries,
there seems to be little reason for the denial of contribution in the
instant case.
Perhaps the Ninth Circuit's misunderstanding of section 201(b)
resulted from its misreading of the Supreme Court decision in Johansen
v. United States.1 2 The court cited that case for the proposition that
the FECA is the exclusive remedy against the United States of injured
seamen employed on public vessels. While Johansen so held, the
decision was not based on section 201(b), but instead on a rather surprising assertion, contradicting Senator Morse, that Congress had never
provided seamen on public vessels with a remedy against the United
States other than under the FECA, even before the FECA was made
Although the court did not refer specifically to § 2oz(b), by necessity it meant
that section rather than the FECA in general. The FECA was enacted on September
7, 1916.

39 Stat. 742 (z916), as amended,

S

U.S.C.

§§

751-803a (1958).

The duty

of the United States to other shipowners to navigate its public vessels carefully came
into existence afterwards upon the passage of the Public Vessels Act on March 3, t925.
-3Stat. Xiii (1925), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (x958). See note 4 supra.
Section 2ox(b) was not added to the FECA until October 14, 1949. 63 Stat. 861
(1949), S U.S.C. § 7 57 (b) (1958). Obviously, only § 2ot(b) could have repealed
rights created by the Public Vessels Act.
12 95 CONG. REc 13608 (1949).
12 343 U.S. 427 (xgSz).
The court also cited Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S.
49S (19s9), which followed Johansen.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1962: 43 7

exclusive by section 201(b) in .1949.1' The Court in Johansen, how-

ever, did not suggest that third parties, such as shipowners, had not
had rights outside the FECA against the United States before section
201(b) was passed."4

Therefore, Johansen, having been decided in

disregard of the statutory policy of non-exclusive liability embodied in
the proviso to section 2oi(b), can hardly be extended to support a
decision which takes away an established right of shipowners.1" This
conclusion is reinforced by the additional fact that Johansen seems
dearly to have been wrongly decided.18 Four Justices dissented in
Johansen, agreeing with Senator Morse that seamen had remedies
against the Government outside the FECA, and that the proviso to
section 2oi(b) preserved those remedies.1 7 As the dissent indicated,
none of the relevant statutes or decisions supported the Johansen
0 the Supreme
majority.18 For example, in Fleet Corp. v. Lustgarten"

Court had acknowledged a right of government seamen to recover
against the United States outside the FECA. In view of the strong
doubts expressed, it is difficult to justify an extension of Johansen to
abrogate a shipowner's right to contribution.
The Weyerhaeuser decision, indefensible as it is under the proviso
to section 201(b), could not be defended even if that proviso did not
apply. The Supreme Court's treatment of two other statutes that conflict with the admiralty doctrine of contribution in the same fashion as
does Section 201(b) of the FECA points to the allowance of contribution in Weyerhaeuser20
1 See note io supra.
Indeed, the court in Weyerhaeuser admitted that the United States had once had
a duty to shipowners to navigate carefully in order not to injure its own employees.
See note

1o

supra.

Furthermore, the court in the instant case relied on Underwood v. United States,
207 F.zd 86z (oth Cir. 1953), note 9 supra, and said, 294 F.zd at x84 n.3: "We
agree with the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit. There the court said: 'It is significant,
we think, that the Congress chose to speak in terms of liability of the government, not
in terms of remedies or rights of action, and in doing so, it gave a right of action only
to the extent that it saw fit
to relax governmental immunity from any liability.' . . . 207
F.2d 862, 864." Johansen, however, did not hold that the United States' liability was
exclusive, but only that the seaman's remedy was exclusive.
5

" See notes xo & 14 supra.

" Substantially the same may be said for Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 49
(1959), note x7 supra.
if 343 U.S. at 441.
18
See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 120 ( 4 th Cir. z95o).

United States, 94 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal.
2i8o U.S. 320 (1919).

595o),

See Gibbs v.

for a review of the authorities.

There seem to be no cases on the conflict between the FECA and contribution in
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Under the Harter Act, 21 carriers are relieved of all liability to the
owners of cargo for negligent navigation.22 Cargo owners who have
suffered loss in a collision, however, may sue any non-carrying vessel
that is partly responsible for their losses. The Supreme Court has then
allowed the non-carrying vessel in such cases to have contribution from
the carrying vessel if the latter were by its negligence jointly responsible
for the loss. 23 Thus, by holding shipowners liable to other ships for
contribution for the cargo losses, despite the statute which limits their
liability to the cargo owners, the Court has evinced a strong policy of
liability of shipowners to other ships for damages caused by the negligent navigation of their own ships. Indeed, the Court has considered
this policy so important that it has refused to let shipowners pass their
liability for contribution back to cargo owners by means of contract.
In United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co.,2 4 the Court held invalid a
clause in an ocean bill of lading that required the cargo owner to
indemnify the ship for any amount it might lose by reason of a recovery
admiralty. In The West Point, 71 F. Supp. 2o6 (E.D. Va. 1947), however, a conflict
very similar was decided in favor of contribution. In that case two naval officers of
the United States were injured when the public vessel they were aboard collided with
a ferry boat. The officers brought suit against the ferry boat, her owners, and the
United States. Their suit against the Government was dismissed on the ground that
members of the armed services cannot sue the Government under the Public Vessels
Act, note 4 supra. (Service men are not covered by the FECA, but have a separate
compensatory program.) The court, however, allowed the ferry owners to implead the
United States for contribution. In a later disposition of the case, 83 F. Supp. 68o
(E.D. Va. 1949), the United States was held liable to the owners of the ferry for
contribution for the damages paid to the officers.
21 27 Stat. 445 (1893),
46 U.S.C. §§ 9o-96 (1958). The statements in the text
concerning the Harter Act apply equally to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49
Stat. 1207 (936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1958), which has superseded the Harter
Act in many areas. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 1,9-69 (-957).
(1893), 46 U.S.C. § 192 (1958),
22 Section 3 of the Harter Act, 27 Stat. 445
provides:
"If the owner of any vessel transporting merchandise or property to or from any
port in the United States of America shall exercise due diligence to make the said
vessel in all respects seaworthy and properly manned, equipped, and supplied, neither
the vessel, her owner or owners, agent, or charterers, shall become or be held responsible
for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in navigation or in the management
of said vessel . . . ." The analogous provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act,
§ 4(2)(a), 49 Stat. 1210 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2 ) (a) (1958), saves harmless a
carrier or his vessel from liability for any: "Act, neglect, or default of the master,
mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management
of the ship .... "
"2 The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (.899).
" 343 U.S. 236 (195z).
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by the cargo owner from a non-carrier vessel for cargo damages which
are included in the damages to be divided between the two ships. 2
Another statute which conflicts with admiralty contribution is the
Longshoremen & Harbor Workers Compensation Act.2" That act protects covered employers with an exclusive liability clause similar to
section 201(b), without the proviso.2 7 There is a split of authority,
however, as to whether the exclusive liability dause bars shipowners
from dividing with employers payments made to longshoremen for
injuries caused by the joint fault of shipowner and employer.2 Inasmuch as longshoremen are rarely involved in ship collisions, the split
of authority may never be resolved, since the Supreme Court has held
that admiralty contribution is not available in non-collision cases. 20 Despite the fact that the question of contribution has thus been rendered
moot, a later line of cases has effectively robbed the employer of his
exclusive liability under the L&HWCA in those instances where he is
jointly responsible with a shipowner for his employee's injury. In
Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, 0 the Third Circuit recognized an implied
" The court in the instant case admitted that the Harter Act decisions are strong
authority for division despite the FECA, but purported to distinguish them on the
ground that the Harter Act was not intended to affect a shipowner's liability to third
parties, while the FECA specifically governs the rights of third parties growing out of
an injury to a federal employee. 294 F.zd at 185. This distinction, of course,
assumes the controlling applicability of § 2oz(b), without consideration of the proviso
thereto.
Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958).
5, 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958).
s Contribution allowed: Barbarino v. Stanhope S.S. Co., 151 F.zd 553 (2d Cir.
1945)i New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co. v. Lee's Lighters, 48 F.zd 372 (E.D.N.Y.
1930); Barber S.S. Lines v. Quinn Bros., 94 F. Supp. 212 (Mass. x95o ) 5 Portel v.
1844

United States, 85 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); The S.S. Samovar, 72 F. Supp. 574

(N.D. Cal. 1947); The Tampico, 45 F. Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y. 1942)5 Rederii v.

Jarka Corp., 26 F. Supp. 304 (Me. 1939). Contribution denied: American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.zd 322 (2d Cir. x95o); Johnson v. United States,
79 F. Supp. 448 (Ore. 1948); Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works v. Rukert
Terminals Corp., 193 Md. zo, 6 5 A.zd 304 (-949).
" Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. z8z (.952).
In the Halcyon Lines case the Court specifically refused to decide whether the L&HWCA
barred the claim of contribution, reserving that question until properly before it in
a collision case. However, certain language in the Court's opinion indicates that the
Court might decide in favor of contribution in a collision case:
"Where two vessels collide due to the fault of both, it is established admiralty doctrine that the mutual wrongdoers shall share equally the damages sustained by each,
as well as personal injury and property damage inflicted on innocent third parties."
342 U.S. at 284.
so 2o6 F.zd 784 ( 3 d Cir. 1953).
Later, in the case of Brown v. AmericanHawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F.zd z6, 18 n.4 (3 d Cir. 1954), the same court stated that it
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contract of. indemnity under which shipowners may recover from an
employer the total payments made to a longshoreman for injuries. In
Ryan Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Corp.3 ' the Supreme Court adopted this doctrine as its own, holding that a shipowner could recover from a longshoreman's employer upon an implied warranty to stow cargo in a
reasonably safe fashion. The result has been that the negligent employer now pays any damages his employee recovers from-a shipowner,
despite the employer's "exclusive liability" protection.3
The exception to the United States' liability for negligence to shipowners s made in Weyerhaeuser unjustly casts the entire burden of
the government seaman's injury upon the private shipowner 3 ' This
result is unfair, not only because the United States was jointly at fault,
but also because the United States could have had contribution from
Weyerhaeuser had Ostrum been a seaman of the private vessel, recovering his damages from the government. The general policy of
compensation statutes, which results in providing an employee only
one remedy against his employer, does not require the abrogation of
the shipowner's established, independent right of contribution. 35 The
would be diffcult for it to conceive of a situation where there would not be an implied
contract upon which indemnity could be based when stevedores were on and about a ship.
at 350 U.S. 124 (2956).
8
The Supreme Court re-endorsed the Ryan decision in several cases. Waterman
S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364. U.S. 421 (296o); Crumady v. The
Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (x959); Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema
Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
The Ryan and Crumnady cases establish that the employer's implied warranty includes
at least negligent operation of equipment aboard ship and negligent failure to inspect
for defects. Lower court decisions indicate that employers must be almost completely
free of negligence to avoid liability. See, e.g., Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 274 F.zd 857 (9 th Cir. 196o ) ; Royal Mail Lines, Ltd. v.
Peck, 269 F.zd 875 ( 9 th Cir. z959); American Export Lines v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82
( 4 th Cir. 1959); Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 266 F.2d 79 ( 4 th Cir.
1959).
See generally, GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 358-74 (957).
:s See notes 4 & Io supra for the statute upon which liability is founded.
"The United States will be relieved of all liability to its injured employee in the
instant case. Under § 27 of the FECA, 39 Stat. 747 (z9z6), S U.S.C. § 777 (x958),
the United States can recover the compensation it has paid an employee out of any
recovery or settlement the employee has had from a third party. In Randall v. United
States, 282 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. x96o), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 813 (ig6x), such a
recovery was allowed despite the fact that the United States was by its negligence
jointly responsible for the employee's injury.
The result is that in the instant case the FECA is not the government's "exclusive"
liability; in essence the Government has no liability. Thus, the United States is better
off as a joint tort-feasor than when no one is at fault.
" See notes to & 25 supra.
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justification for making compensation the employee's exclusive remedy
lies in the "bargain" that is said to underlie compensation statutes8 a
Under these statutes employers stabilize the costs of industrial injuries
by making relatively small, regularized payments to employees for
injuries regardless of fault. In return for sure compensation, employees
give up an uncertain, but possibly large common law recovery. However, employees' rights against third parties are not cut off by the
"bargain."3 7 On the contrary, employees may sue third parties for
negligence. 8 If, as in Weyerhaeuser, the third party is then denied
his independent right of contribution from the United States, it is he,
rather than the parties to the "bargain," who must bear the expense
of the compensation system.
Admiralty contribution must be distinguished from any common law or statutory
right of contributions in which one tort-feasor is subrogated to the injured parties' rights
against the other tort-feasor. Admiralty contribution, being but one aspect of the rights
to divide the damages of a collision, is based upon as independent duty every vessel
owes every other vessel to navigate with reasonable care. See Erie R.R. v. Erie Transp.
Co., 204 U.S. 220, 2a6 (1907).

Non-admiralty contribution from employers has been held barred under state compensation laws containing an exclusive liability provision similar to § 2ox (b). Without
the proviso the primary reason given for barring contribution has been that covered
employers are not "tort-feasors," since they are not liable in tort to their employees.
Therefore there is no basis of joint liability upon which subrogation can be founded.
See z LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 76.2x-.z2 (Supp. 196t). Obviously,
this reasoning is irrelevant to admiralty contribution.
:5 See 2 LARSoN, WORUKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6S.io (Supp. 196).
' See 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 71.10.-.20 (Supp. x96t).
"This is precisely what happened in the Weyerhaeuser case. Cf. note 34 upra.

